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so clearly resolved in the collective mind of the nation that it should 
be called "constitutional" and removed from the realm of political 
debate? 
For any who share Dr. Agresta's concern for effective checks 
to prevent judicial review from operating to constitute the Supreme 
Court an undemocratic ruler, selective de-pyramidization of the 
federal judiciary is a practical, historically precedented, and clearly 
constitutional possibility worthy of serious thought. 
DUE PROCESS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE. 
By Jerry L. Mashaw.' New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press. 1985. Pp. xiv, 279. $24.00. 
Ronald A. Cass 2 
The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments have for some time been among the deadliest foes of trees. 
Courts constantly write about these clauses, and numerous academ-
ics--chiefly professors of law, philosophy, or government-have of-
fered words of wisdom on the derivation, meaning, and role of due 
process. Due process is, indeed, the Constitution's clause celebre. 
It is hard to find much new to say about due process. It is hard 
even to find new ways to phrase old thoughts about due process, 
much less better ways. Authors who would add to the literature on 
due process must overcome a presumption that their messages are 
trite, trivial, or implausible. Jerry Mashaw's book clearly succeeds. 
There are many ways to write about due process. One can ap-
proach the subject historically, tracing the development and use of 
the concept from its appearance in the Magna Charta as the re-
quirement of action per legem terrae (by the law of the land). An-
other approach is doctrinal analysis, not just reporting the cases but 
evaluating the legal tests for due process against implicit or explicit 
criteria for legal decisionmaking. A third sort of inquiry is philo-
sophical, asking what process rules would be used in a good or just 
society. 
In some measure Mashaw's book may be classed as belonging 
to all of these genres, but none is a good fit. A better description of 
the book is an exploration of the due process field. Mashaw roams 
through case law and commentary, searching for arguments that 
I. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. Professor of Law, Boston University. Thanks to my colleague, Ira Lupu, for his 
helpful comments. 
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will shed light on what due process is, on how we should think 
about it, and on how courts should apply the due process clauses. 
He discovers arguments, examines them, and turns them over and 
looks at them from another angle. Mashaw keeps some arguments, 
or at least pieces of them, discards others, and moves on, finding 
more arguments, examining these, and then often discarding a piece 
he previously thought worth keeping. Finally, Mashaw picks up 
some pieces previously discarded, puts them together with the few 
he has retained from his trek, and discusses the products of his ex-
ploratory journey. 
I 
Mashaw begins by identifying the field he will explore. The 
field is not due process. Rather, it is administrative law. The cen-
tral problem of administrative law is that administrators have dis-
cretion and affect other people's lives. In combination, these facts 
require a theory that can legitimate bureaucratic discretion. 
Three theories are at hand. One, the "transmission belt" the-
sis, posits that bureaucrats are merely extensions of the legislative-
political process; bureaucratic discretion is legitimated by the polit-
ical process that creates it and checks its operation. The second, the 
expertise thesis, argues that bureaucratic discretion is a necessary 
by-product of expert judgment by specialists, whose knowledge of 
some particular area, like the automobile mechanic's or the neuro-
surgeon's, has value to society independent of political actors' ca-
pacity to constrain their decisions. The third legitimating thesis is 
that the very process of bureaucratic decisionmaking provides ave-
nues for participation by interested parties sufficient to justify the 
exercise of bureaucrats' power. 
Mashaw links the three legitimating theories to the historical 
development of administrative law, admits the looseness of the fit 
between history and theory, and critiques the theories. None of the 
theories is found to be a good justification for bureaucratic power. 
The transmission belt thesis really sidesteps the argument against 
administrative discretion, substituting a tautology for analysis of the 
claim against discretion. Expertise is not a plausible explanation for 
much administrative discretion, which can more readily be de-
scribed by various capture theories. Participation in agency deci-
sionmaking need not replicate participation in legislative 
decisionmaking; it need not produce the decision the legislative pro-
cess would; and it need not produce fair results. The theories of 
administrative legitimacy, thus, are unsatisfactory ultimately be-
cause each is incomplete without a normative thesis of what admin-
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istrative decisionmaking ought to be, who ought to participate, and 
how that participation should be weighted and structured. That 
normative thesis will be coextensive with a definition of due process. 
The problem of administrative discretion, thus, is the problem 
of due process. Mashaw has set the stage for exploring the meaning 
of due process mainly in the context of arguments against the exer-
cise of administrative discretion. The field to be explored is the 
meaning of due process as the foundation of legitimate administra-
tive power. The starting point is not an examination of arguments 
intended to legitimate government power, but rather the meaning of 
the due process guarantee that constrains government power. 
Having introduced the central problem to be explored, 
Mashaw then devotes roughly three-fifths of his book to examina-
tion of the principal models of due process. Three models, gener-
ally analogous to the three explanations of administrative 
legitimacy, are examined in the same sequence as their legitimacy 
analogues. 
First, Mashaw discusses the "model of appropriateness." 
Under this model, courts ask whether the procedure used in making 
a particular administrative decision resembles the procedures gener-
ally used to make similar decisions. In part, the appropriateness 
inquiry is whether current rules have been followed: The model 
asks whether the process used is the ordinary, regular process or 
whether it is different and therefore suspect. There are two 
problems with this inquiry: the analogical basis for application of 
the model always will be open to question (how do you know what 
decisions are best analogized to this one?), and the reliance on tradi-
tion may inhibit beneficial change (Mashaw notes here the early 
New Deal experience). Moreover, legal analysis under the appro-
priateness model tends to be overly formal or overly abstract. It 
can only provide clear rules for decision at the expense of sensitivity 
to the range of different decisions and decisional processes that may 
be appropriate. 
Ultimately, the appropriateness model is wanting because it 
does not rest on principle. It relies instead on the common-law in-
stinct that a rule of adherence to tradition, even if not capable of 
precise formulation, best keeps the faith with whatever principles do 
guide us. Finding appropriateness both operationally and intellec-
tually deficient, Mashaw sets this model aside. 
The second due process model examined is the "model of com-
petence." This model, embraced by the Supreme Court in Mathews 
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v. Eldridge,3 asks that procedures minimize error costs. These costs 
are given by the number of errors a process produces and the cost of 
the respective errors. This "social cost accounting" approach to 
due process has the benefit of explicit advertence to the balancing of 
interests that takes place under any approach. It also has the bene-
fit of grounding in a normative framework, utilitarianism. But 
Mashaw notes the Court's incomplete fidelity to utilitarianism in its 
implementation of the competence model. Mashaw also finds the 
court's application of the model less than completely faithful to the 
terms of the Mathews test. 
One possible reason for haphazard application is that earnest 
application of the competence model requires an enormous amount 
of information about process effects and individual values. The in-
formational requirements of the competence model do more than 
frustrate serious and consistent application. They also undermine 
the judicial role in due process adjudication because the information 
may be more accessible to legislatures than to courts. Mashaw por-
trays the competence model as inclining courts toward both unprin-
cipled intervention in and unprincipled abstention from control of 
the administrative process. After reviewing the perils of compe-
tence-based review, and especially the "positivist trap" exemplified 
by Justice Rehnquist's "bitter with the sweet" argument,4 Mashaw 
concludes that the competence model cannot be the basis for due 
process analysis. At the same time, he sees the concern about accu-
rate decisionmaking, which is central to the competence model, as a 
critical process concern. The interest in accuracy, however, does 
not stand alone. It is the surrogate for some other concern. 5 
II 
Mashaw now, midway through the book, has defined his field 
of interest, quickly examined and rejected three administrative law 
models, and more fully examined and rejected two due process 
models. The reader knows that only one due process model re-
mains. Surely, this model must contain the answers and must iden-
tify the concern for which accuracy is but an imperfect proxy. 
3. 424 u.s. 319 (1976) 
4. The "positivist trap" is Mashaw's term for strong judicial deference to legislative 
decisions on process. When it is admitted that a utilitarian calculus supports the judicial 
decision and that legislatures may be able to make such a calculus better than courts-is 
society better off if government employees receive higher pay and less job security or the 
other way around?-it is difficult to avoid total abdication of the judicial role in supervising 
process choices. 
5. See p. 157. Mashaw describes accuracy as an important function of an unknown 
variable "f(x)." 
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Mashaw's third model of due process, the "model of dignitary val-
ues," thus arrives with high expectations for its resolving power. 
At first, Mashaw's treatment of this third model further boosts 
our expectations. Before elaborating on the model, Mashaw de-
tours for some additional advertising on its behalf. He describes its 
history, finding strands of dignitary concern interwoven with appro-
priateness and competence in hoary Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
He finds contemporary support for the values a dignitary model 
protects. And he suggests ways in which a focus on dignitary val-
ues promises to solve the difficulties of the other models. 
Yet, in the course of promoting the model to come, Mashaw's 
language intimates an unwillingness to make more than very mod-
est claims for it: "A dignitary theory that sought to articulate, de-
fend, and effectuate a process-oriented conception of procedural due 
process just might discover, in its quest for the core conditions of 
individual dignity, principles that could both explain and limit indi-
vidual demands for particularized official responsiveness." Here, 
Mashaw begins to shift from the gains a dignitary theory offers to 
the difficulty of developing such a theory. His treatment of the dig-
nitary approach over the remaining hundred pages or so of the book 
places at least as much stress on the difficulties and weaknesses of 
the dignitary approach as on its benefits. Indeed, even before artic-
ulating the model, Mashaw explicitly acknowledges its limitations: 
I can specify no algorithm for the unimpeachable resolution of due process claims. 
I have not solved the problem of how to combine political philosophy with constitu-
tional adjudication. My arguments for a dignitary approach are marked by the 
frustrating interplay of logic and contingency common to all such efforts. I will not 
offer support to those who would move constitutional analysis beyond liberty and 
toward community; my theory leaves the implementation of communitarian ideals 
at a subconstitutionallevel. For I believe not all institution building is or should be 
accomplished through constitutional adjudication. 
Mashaw here does more than apologize for the dignitary 
model's imperfection and for the necessity of making a normative 
choice that will not gain universal assent: he also shifts from third 
person to first person writing, from describing and discussing 
others' models to building his own. That is the burden of the last 
two-fifths of his book. But Mashaw is in no hurry to build. Thus, 
he turns back to revisit the models suggested by other proponents of 
dignitary values. These models serve as stalking horses for Mashaw 
as he works through the strengths and weaknesses of the dignitary 
approach.6 
The goal, then, is to begin spelling out the sources, meanings, 
6. See. e.g., pp. 179-80 (discussing position taken by Professor Frank Michelman). 
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and operational consequences of the dignitary approach before 
specifying a model to encapsulate it. Dignitary approaches build on 
notions of respect for individuals, recognizing the contribution of 
decisional transparency, rationality, and consistency to such re-
spect. 1 Process should advance these goals. The goals are part of 
the set of intuitions defining "fundamental fairness" which Mashaw 
derives from the liberal tradition. Mashaw examines this tradition 
briefly but cogently, separating several threads of the tradition and 
explaining which threads best support the arguments for dignitary 
proces constraints on government power.s 
The intuitive derivation of process claims provides a central 
concern for due process, but it does not provide a strong set of 
rights. Process claims are not assertions of entitlement to respect 
posited in opposition to arguments of disrespect. They are claims 
for respect that must be weighed against competing claims, with no 
obvious means for weighting the values of respect on either side of 
the balance and no obvious means for evaluating the instrumental 
contribution of any process to respect. Does a judicial hearing nec-
essarily contribute more to respect than majoritarian-political deci-
sionmaking? Not necessarily, for majority rule can be derived from 
propositions of individual autonomy and rationality. Mashaw con-
cludes that the dignitary model, to effectuate its goals, must resort 
to prudential balancing and that the judiciary enjoys no clear com-
parative advantage at such balancing. 
The defects of the dignitary model seem as troubling as those 
of the appropriateness and competence models. But Mashaw, hav-
ing exposed these defects, is not willing to concede that dignity has 
no more to offer than other approaches: 
. . . I am rather encouraged by the way in which a search for first principles and a 
sketch of their application incorporates the valuable insights of prior models of due 
process adjudication. In particular the dignitary approach seems to explain much 
of what is valuable in the model of competence and to present those values in a 
more plausible and convincing way. Attention to accuracy is obviously important. 
It relates to our most general due process demands for a reasonably stable, coher-
ent, and therefore comprehensible legal order. Such a legal order cannot survive 
legal decision making that is arbitrary, that ignores what is or can be known about 
the physical and social world in which we attempt to plan our actions and achieve 
our goals. 
Of equal or greater importance, the dignitary model explains our concern to 
7. Mashaw also argues separately for dignitary sub-values of participation and 
privacy. 
8. The principal strands of liberal thought are assimilated from the works of John 
Locke, Jeremy Bentham, and Immanuel Kant, although others' writings are noted. John 
Rawls receives considerable attention, given the space devoted to exploration of liberal 
thought. 
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respect the positive law. Majority rule is integrated into the set of dignitary values 
that are of interest to individuals. Judicial deference therefore is not the abdication, 
but the fulfillment of the judiciary's accepted constitutional mission of protecting 
individual rights. Yet, unlike the positivist traps that beset the model of compe-
tence, there is here no logical implication of universal judicial abdication. Majority 
rule's support for individual perceptions of equal citizenship need not always trump 
other dignitary values. For the substantive right that due process protects is not 
some contingent substantive claim embodied in positive law, but the fundamental 
individual right to legal arrangements that preserve the preconditions for moral 
agency and self-respect. Majority rule with universal suffrage is but one of those 
preconditions. It must somehow be accommodated to others where, in specific situ-
ations, they compete. 
From what has been said it seems also to follow that the dignitary model, 
unlike the prior models, is not embarrassed by the relationship of substantive and 
procedural claims. The basic value of individual self-respect is obviously substan-
tive. Yet at its core it is noncontroversial. The maintenance of individual liberty is 
what the American Constitution is preeminently about. To say that due process 
analysis proceeds from this substantive basis carries none of the implications of 
judicial usurpation that have long been associated with the term "substantive due 
process." The substantive agenda is neither hidden, as in the model of appropriate-
ness, nor is it misdirected to general social welfare considerations, as in the model of 
competence. 
Despite the superficial similarity to defects of other models, the 
only real problem with the dignitary approach, Mashaw tells us, is 
that it needs translation into simple rules for judges. Mashaw de-
votes his pentulimate chapter to that end, introducing the "model of 
dignitary appropriateness." The effort in this model is to construct 
prototypes of appropriate processes out of the lessons gleaned from 
exploring dignitary values. The main message of dignity is that 
"state power shall not be used to subject any person to the will of 
another." The mechanisms for preventing personal domination are 
consent to particular decisions (or at least to particular decisional 
processes) and general, impersonal rules. These statements suggest 
four ideal process types: negotiation, majoritarian voting, bureau-
cratic administration, and adjudication. Each process type has a 
legitimating requirement: there must be actual consent in negotia-
tion, opportunity to participate in voting, rational and efficient deci-
sions in bureaucratic administration, and fairness in adjudication. 
Mashaw hopes that courts will be able to identify the ideal process 
type for any given decision and ascertain serious departures from 
the ideal. Mashaw urges the value of his approach at improving the 
"constitutional conversation" in which courts and commentators 
are engaged, although he recognizes the imprecision of the ideal de-
cision and process types. This recognition leads to his final argu-
ment, that much of the elaboration of appropriate processes belongs 
to the "subconstitutional dialogue" of non-judicial branches rather 
than the courts' constitutional conversation. 
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III 
At the end of Professor Mashaw's exploration, what has the 
reader learned? The answer no doubt will vary markedly from 
reader to reader, but there are plenty of learning opportunities to be 
had. Due Process in the Administrative State provides a good over-
view of the literature and arguments concerning due process, and is 
a very useful introduction for beginners. For old hands at this 
game, the book offers a wealth of interesting and intelligent com-
mentary on an impressive array of writings in administrative law, 
constitutional law, political science, and philosophy, as well as on a 
fair cross-section of the judicial decisions applying due process 
concepts. 
The writings and decisions that are grist for Mashaw's mill 
have not, by and large, escaped others' notice. Mashaw's book does 
not introduce into the controversy over due process analysis a new 
body of thinking that previously lay unnoticed outside the due pro-
cess walls.9 Nor is Mashaw's commentary strikingly novel. His 
categorization of legitimating concepts of administrative law, for in-
stance, owes much to Professor Richard Stewart's earlier work, 10 a 
debt Professor Mashaw acknowledges. 
Yet even where the book tracks past learning, Mashaw's treat-
ment is both useful and engaging. In part, that is because so often it 
is the better, more thoughtful commentary that Mashaw's analysis 
tracks. In part, the book engages even where it recapitulates be-
cause there is a freshness to Mashaw's rethinking of old problems. 
The book is also useful because it brings together so many of the 
diverse strands that run through this subject. Due Process presents 
Mashavian observations on majority rule, judicial review, social 
contracts, the Kantian categorical imperative, and the relationship 
between substantive and procedural constraints on governmental 
action. Whatever time one has spent thinking about due process, 
there is something in Mashaw's commentary to spark rethinking or 
to rekindle old faiths. 
That contribution is more than enough to ask of a book about 
due process. Professor Mashaw, however, has aspired to more than 
9. The two bodies of literature that readers of standard law review fare on due process 
may not readily link to due process-Kantian philosophy and political choice or political 
science treatments of majority rule-previously were employed in discussion of due process 
in Epstein, Voting Theory. Union Elections. and the Constitution, in NOMOS XVIII: DuE PRo-
CESS 333 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977) [hereinafter cited as NoMOS XVIII]; Kuftik, 
Majority Rule Procedure, in NoMos XVIII, supra, at 296; Pincoffs, Due Process. Fraternity. 
and a Kantian Injunction, in NOMOS XVIII, supra, at 172. 
10. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 
(1975). 
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thoughtful commentary on a broad range of related issues. His last 
chapters attempt a synthesis of approaches to due process that will 
differ from other authors' visions and move beyond even Mashaw's 
own copious prior work in this area. Mashaw offers the "model of 
dignitary appropriateness" as a solution to problems of the other 
approaches he has examined. He does not, after exposing its flaws, 
suggest that normative conflicts at the core of due process resist all 
attempts at resolution, his included. Although Mashaw recognizes 
some of the limits of his last model-recognition that in part in-
forms his plea for more reliance on subconstitutional dialogue and 
less on constitutional conversation-he endeavors, understandably, 
to convince readers that his approach substantially improves due 
process analysis. 
This is the most difficult and least successful part of the book. 
To succeed at the level of grand theory, Mashaw must solve the two 
problems for which he criticizes other models. First, a principle is 
necessary to explain why courts should override the decisions of 
other branches. Second, the principle must yield coherent instruc-
tions that allow courts to intervene at predictable times, without 
leaving courts general discretion to intervene or abstain. Thus, a 
solution must avoid both a positivism that obviates judicial scrutiny 
of government decisionmaking processes, as well as unbridled judi-
cial power, whether actively exercised or dormant. 
The first quest is for the legal version of the philosopher's 
stone. To answer that courts override legislative-administrative de-
cisions because the Constitution commands it, is of course no an-
swer at all.'' Here, as generally in constitutional argument, the 
search is for help in plumbing the protean commands of the docu-
ment. Mashaw rightly seeks grounding in extra-constitutional prin-
ciples that can be related to the constitutional text. But, perhaps 
inevitably, the foundation rests on soft earth. 
One main support for Mashaw's due process structure is the 
second formulation of Kant's imperative for universality of reason, 
to treat others as ends and not merely as means. Mashaw suggests 
that a basis for judicial protection of individual claims to process 
rights is derivable from the liberal tradition in general and the 
Kantian instruction in particular. The syllogism that emerges from 
Mashaw's treatment of Kant is this: 
(I) A strong consensus in our liberal tradition says that how we treat people is 
II. Hence, all the argument over the derivation of constitutional meaning. See Cass, 
The Meaning of Liberty: Notes on Problems Within the Fraternity, I NOTRE DAME J.L. ETH-
ICS & PuB. PoL'Y 777 (1985). 
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important and that our treatment should convey respect, including equality as an 
aspect of respect. 
(2) The process of public decisionmaking, as it derives from positive law, does not 
always conform to this command of respect. 
(3) Hence, judicial protection of process rights is appropriate to ensure respect. 
Mashaw recognizes that majoritarian decisionmaking itself has 
a claim as a guarantor of appropriate respect. Indeed, in a cursory 
reference to Kenneth May's work, 12 Mashaw declares that majority 
rule is the only decision rule that serves claims of equal respect at 
least under certain conditions (not noting the substantial debate 
over the conditions on which May's axiom rests, a debate that sug-
gests less than universal agreement that majority rule is optimal).I3 
Majority rule does not invariably produce decisions-especially de-
cisions about processes for delegated decisions-that seem congru-
ent with respect-derived concerns about process. Yet Mashaw also 
recognizes that process concerns must be balanced against other, 
competing individual concerns that also deserve respect. These ad-
missions and qualifications undermine the value of liberal thought 
for solving the controversy between judicial abstentionists and 
interventionists.I4 
Ultimately, Mashaw's contention is that a constitutional due 
process provision must, if it is to have any meaning, allowsome judi-
cial supercession of majority decisions. The real contest is not 
against complete judicial deference to other branches. Rather, the 
choice is between deference except when some narrow core of inter-
ests is at stake Is and non-deference in some broader class of cases.I6 
Mashaw chooses the latter; but he does so with obvious reserva-
12. May, A Set of Independent, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions/or Simple Majority 
Decision, 20 EcoNOMETRICA 680 (1952). 
13. See, e.g., D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 209-26 (1979). 
14. Similar arguments about the power of liberal ideals (sometimes generalized to other 
abstract conceptions of good) to resolve concrete disputes have been made in numerous other 
contexts. See, e.g. ,M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); Leff, Un-
speakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229; Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, 
and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L. REv. 1103 (1983). 
15. For example, when the government immediately, substantially, and directly threat-
ens physical liberty or property now in an individual's possession by a decision based on 
determinations specifically referring to that individual. See, e.g., Shattuck, The True Mean-
ing of the Term "Liberty" in Those Clauses in the Federal and State Constitutions Which 
Protect "Life, Liberty, and Property," 4 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1891); Warren, The New "Lib-
erty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431 (1926); Williams, Liberty 
and Propeny: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3 (1983). 
16. See, e.g., Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the 
Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 TEX. L. REv. 875 (1982); Leubsdorf, Constitutional 
Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579 (1984); Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Toward 
a More Responsive Approach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1978); 
Tushnet, The Newer Property: Suggestion for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 
SUP. CT. REV. 261. 
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tions-refiected in his prudential compromises-and he cannot con-
vincingly establish the choice as more than a matter of taste. 
Mashaw emphasizes that the taste, at least in the abstract, is widely 
shared. There is, however, no ready referendum on the specific ap-
plications of this principle or even on its popularity relative to com-
peting abstract conceptions. 
The principle's resolving power is also suspect. The four ideal 
process types are an interesting effort to expand the number of 
molds into which many courts and commentators would force gov-
ernmental decisions.11 Mashaw's effort on this score should be ap-
plauded, given the diverse array of interests, issues, and 
circumstances that define governmental decisions. Yet two of the 
four process types seem to have quite limited utility. Negotiation 
may indeed, as Mashaw urges, be the ideal that informs the positiv-
ist vision embraced by Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedy, Is but 
if Mashaw would abandon that vision, where can negotiation be in-
voked as the ideal process? Mashaw's contention must be that, for 
the Arnett plurality, any discharge process ratified by contract is 
constitutionally acceptable. But the critical question is whether a 
government can ask its employees to accept certain contract 
terms.I9 If one does not generally defer to legislative decisions on 
process, should contracts based on such legislative decisions stand 
in better stead? Voting, too, would seem to have little use in due 
process analysis. Voting is not an ideal process for administrative 
decisionmaking. Instead, like negotiation, voting as an ideal puts in 
issue the appropriate judicial deference to another decisionmaker.2o 
Thus, these two process types simply rephrase the argument that 
17. The dominant model of administrative action posits a choice between two types of 
government decisional processes. For a discussion of this model and its principal competitors 
and an argument that a richer model with more process types is desirable, see Cass, Models of 
Administrative Action, 72 VA. L. REv. 363 (1986). 
18. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). Mashaw also argues that the Court adhered to this vision in 
Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976). Seep. 241. 
19. This is the point often missed by those who stress notions of consent. See, e.g., 
Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (deciding, almost entirely on contract grounds, 
that a constructive trust could be imposed on proceeds from a book published in violation of 
a CIA prepublication clearance requirement; the former government employee argued that 
the requirement, to which all CIA employees must agree, violated the First Amendment). 
For discussion of related problems, see Westen, "Freedom" and "Coercion"-Virtue Words 
and Vice Words, 1985 DUKE L.J. 541. 
20. Voting by affected parties is seldom used as a decision process for delegated admin-
istrative action. Voting becomes a relevant process only insofar as we are willing to defer to 
elected officials to select appropriate administrative procedures. Thus, voting is less an ideal 
process type for administrative decisionmaking than an alternative to judicial process selec-
tion. In other words, this paradigm restates the question: is deference to other branches 
appropriate? The question obviously is relevant to due process analysis, but it does not ad-
vance thinking about administrative decisionmaking processes to state the deference issue in 
terms of an ideal process type. 
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judicial supervision of process is sometimes inappropriate. To the 
question, "when?," we now reply: when opportunities for demo-
cratic participation or negotiation are adequate protection against 
domination. Here we go again. 
The last two processes, administration and adjudication, are 
general process types that do compete in many arguments over gov-
ernmental decisionmaking.21 It is fair enough to argue that each is 
appropriate in some circumstances. Administrative law in good 
measure is the elaboration of competing conceptions of when each 
of these processes should be used.22 Mashaw argues that one, ad-
ministration, is useful in resolving fact disputes, the other, adjudica-
tion, in resolving conflicts among values. 
That said, Mashaw recognizes that the division between ad-
ministration and adjudication is artificial, and that application of 
these categories is far from mechanical: "The determination that a 
decision is allocable to any particular process model is obviously to 
construct reality, not to find it. Judicial justification of the applica-
tion of such simplified constructions on the ground that some par-
ticular decision necessarily implies one or another particular 
decision process will strain our credulity to the breaking point." 
How, then, does Mashaw's approach better guide courts than the 
approaches he has discarded along the way? Despite his claims for 
the model of dignitary appropriateness, there is little basis to think 
that it does offer courts surer footing. 
These criticisms in general merely restate points Professor 
Mashaw himself makes, implicitly or explicitly. In context, his em-
phasis on conversation and dialogue can be understood as more 
than a concept of process based in respect for other individuals. It 
also is a recognition of the difficulty of giving answers to the intrac-
table problems he is tackling. Better to sell one's views as a conver-
21. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.3 (2d ed. 1979); 
Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rulemaking Versus Adjudication Problem in 
Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DuKE L.J. 103; Pierce, The Choice Between Adjudicating and 
Rulemaking for Formulating and Implementing Energy Policy, 31 HASTINGS L.J. I (1979); 
Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative 
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921 (1965); Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative 
Law, 1985 DUKE L.J. 427. 
22. See Cass, supra note 17. Argument over the respective roles of adjudication and 
administration is not, of course, the sole focus of administrative law. Efforts to enrich the 
administrative law dialogue are numerous. See, e.g., Cass, Black Robes and Blacker Boxes: 
The Changing Focus of Administrative Law, 1984 DUKE L.J. 422; Diver, Policymaking Para-
digms in Administrative Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1981); Frug, The Ideology of Bureau-
cracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Gellhorn & Robinson, Perspectives 
on Administrative Law, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. 771 (1975); Stewart, Regulation in a Liberal 
State: The Role of Non-Commodity Values, 92 YALE L.J. 1537 (1983); Stewart & Sunstein, 
Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1195 (1982). 
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sation than a solution. And, even if he is no better than a number of 
predecessors in this field at defining due process, Mashaw is an ex-
cellent conversationalist. 
As with due process, conclusions about Due Process in the Ad-
ministrative State lend themselves to metaphor. The book is per-
haps best analogized to a train ride. The route is at times difficult to 
discern. The scenery is interesting, lush, and varied; its order some-
times surprising. Veteran travellers will find much of the scenery 
familiar but also will note that many passing vistas appear in a new 
light. Although the journey covers considerable ground, no one 
will be bored on the trip. On disembarking, most will notice that 
they arrived back where they started. But everyone should feel cu-
riously refreshed and glad that they went. 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW. By Rogers M. Smith.' Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press. 1985. Pp. 1, 328. $22.50. 
Kirk Emmert 2 
The law, and particularly American constitutional law, is not 
self-contained. There are both practical and theoretical obstacles to 
confining the meaning of the Constitution to a strict reading of the 
words of the text supplemented, perhaps, by the clear intention of 
its framers. Our fundamental law points beyond itself, both down 
to the political forces and consensus that generate and support it, 
and up to the broader political and moral purposes to which it is 
finally instrumental. Constitutional law, understood as a mediator 
between regime purposes and principles and everyday political life, 
necessitates a Supreme Court that, as Tocqueville argued, is a politi-
cal as well as a legal institution. 
But if this view is more true to the nature of our constitutional 
law than the narrowly legalistic view, it too is problematic and 
raises a host of difficulties. How can we prevent infrequent, princi-
pled, and well-considered exercises in judicial statesmanship from 
giving way to frequent, unprincipled, and ill-considered fiats? Is 
there an understanding of the judicial task that promises to reduce 
instances of judicial imperialism by guiding and restraining judges 
as they move beyond the law to the broader purposes that it serves? 
Is an unelected Court, which is also a powerful political institution, 
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2. Professor of Political Science, Kenyon College. 
